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Hickenlooper Amendment should be their effect on the growth of
international law. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino felt that a re-
view of the Cuban expropriation would retard the growth of inter-
national law. "5 However, the reverse would seem to be true.5"
Since international courts have jurisdiction only when the parties
are consenting nations, many disputes between foreign states and
citizens of the United States would, through application of the act of
state doctrine, not be litigable at all. Farr, if followed should help
to fill this gap in the settlement of transnational disputes. As Mr.
Justice White pointed out in his Sabbatino dissent, our courts, under
the majority ruling, would have to validate automatically, discrimi-
natory and unlawful expropriations.57 Such acts, if they are also
permitted by the law of another nation, would then tend to become
a part of accepted international law. Needless to say, if peace and
order are to be attained through world law, there can be no place
for lawless acts that detract from the stature of international law.
International law has long been declared part of the law of the
United States." ' It would seem, therefore, that our American courts
should follow the precedents of the courts of other nations and
decide these disputes, even though they may involve acts of foreign
states, in the context of international law.59 Farr and the Hicken-
looper Amendment should achieve this result.
TommY W. JARRETT
Labor Law-Application of Antitrust Law to Union Activities-
Extra-Unit Agreements
In an effort to avoid the concentration of economic power, two
national policies have been promulgated that, ironically, result in
apparent conflict. The antitrust policy, intended to distribute power
376 U.S. at 433.
80 Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
87376 U.S. at 439.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895).
"The courts of several countries have not hesitated to declare foreign
expropriations unlawful. See e.g., Anglo-Italian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.,
[1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Civ. Ct. Rome); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,
[1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct.). It is also especially important
to note that the Permanent Arbitration Court in Norvay v. United States,
1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 325 (1933), has declared discriminatory
takings to be in violation of international law.
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among entrepreneurs, establishes prohibitions on the restraint of
competition, while the national labor policy, on the other hand, ex-
empts most union activity from those prohibitions in an attempt to
balance the powers of entrepreneurs and workers. The necessity of
resolving this conflict of attitudes toward competition is perhaps
most pressing when the courts are asked to apply the antitrust laws
to labor unions.' Recently the United States Supreme Court was
faced with that necessity in two cases. In UMW v. Pennington2 Mr.
Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court but speaking for
only three members, said that while it is clear that unions can bar-
gain with multiemployer groups,' the union "forfeits its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed
with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units."4 But in the companion case, Local 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,' the union acted alone and
not at the request of an employer group, and Mr. Justice White
found that an attempt to gain a marketing-hours restriction is "with-
in the protection of the national labor policy and . . . therefore
exempt from the Sherman Act,"6 since such a restriction, he decided,
is intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions.
In Pennington a long controversy concerning a solution to the
problem of overproduction in the coal industry had culminated in
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 in which
'For an analysis of this conflict see Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities,
73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). Professor Winter takes the position that collective
bargaining creates anticompetitive incentives and that there are no general
principles that will reconcile the conflict. For the position that no conflict
exists between the two policies see Frank, The Myth of the Conflict between
Antitrust Law and Labor Law in the Application of Antitrzst Law to Union
Activity, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 1 (1964).
2381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'Approximately four million employees are now governed by collec-
tive bargaining agreements signed by unions with thousands of em-
ployer associations. At the time of the debates on the Taft-Hartley
amendments, proposals were made to limit or outlaw multi-employer
bargaining. These proposals failed of enactment. They were met
with a storm of protest that their adoption would tend to weaken and
not strengthen the process of collective bargaining and would con-
flict with the national labor policy of promoting industrial peace
through effective collective bargaining.
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957).
'381 U.S. at 665 (1965).
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Old. at 689-90.
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the United Mine Workers gave up its opposition to automation and
in return for the resulting higher wages agreed to enforce those
wages against the smaller companies without regard for their ability
to pay.7 The trustees of the UMW retirement fund brought suit
against Phillips Brothers Coal Company, a small operator who had
entered the agreement only under union pressure," to recover royal-
ties due under the agreement. Phillips cross-claimed, alleging that
the union and trustees had conspired with the large operators to
force the smaller companies out of business in violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' The union answered affirmatively
that under section 6 of the Clayton Act 0 it is exempt from the
Sherman Act provisions." On appeal from a verdict against the
union,' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an
exemption from the antitrust laws "does not exist ... where a labor
union combines with a nonlabor organization to restrain competition
in, or to monopolize the marketing of, goods in interstate com-
merce."'
3
Also under union pressure, Jewel Tea Company entered an agree-
Adam, Technology and Productivity in Bitumihwus Coal, 1949-1959, 84
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 1081 (1961). The author reviews the general back-
ground of the industry and the changes after the agreement.
Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1963).
o Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States ... is declared to be illegal .... Every person who shall make
any [such] contract or engage in any [such] combination or con-
spiracy . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine ...or by imprisonment
6 .. or by both....
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor .. . organizations ...
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
1'Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1963).
The charge against the trustees was dismissed by the trial court.
Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1963).
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ment whereby it was to sell meat in Chicago only between nine a.m.
and six p.m. The same agreement had at first been resisted and
then accepted by a multi-employer group of 9,000 other Chicago
meat retailers. Jewel alleged a conspiracy between the union and
the trade association in violation of the Sherman Act but the trial
court, finding no evidence of such a conspiracy, held that the union
had acted in its own interests and was thus entitled to the labor
exemption. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, relying on traditional antitrust law, reversed. The court held
that the agreement between the union and the trade association was
in itself a conspiracy,14 that the determination of marketing hours
is a proprietary function, and that therefore a conspiracy designed
to restrict that function "is a violation of the Sherman Act, and not
entitled to the exemption therefrom. . ... ,1
The history of the Court's efforts to reconcile this conflict of
policies is marked by confusion and uncertainty resulting first from
a lack of legislative guidelines and then from a refusal to recognize
the guidelines once they were established. Thus, in the pre-Clayton
Act era the Court, relying on the broad language of the antitrust
laws and the failure of Congress to include a proposed labor exemp-
tion, decided in Loewe v. Lawlor"6 that a secondary boycott was
susceptible to a suit for treble damages because the Sherman Act
"provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade was illegal.' 1 7 Two years later the Court relied on
this construction to uphold an injunction against a "we don't patron-
ize" list published in a union paper.'
8
But in 1914 the congressional response was that human labor is
not a commodity" and that certain enumerated activities are not to
be considered a violation of the federal laws.20 Such language should
"' Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, Inc., 331 F.2d 547, 551
(7th Cir. 1964).
'15 Id. at 549.
10208 U.S. 274 (1908).117 Id. at 301.
'8 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
' Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
"'No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States... in any case between an employer and employees,
or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury. ...
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
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have been a more than adequate guideline, but seven years later in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering"' the Court circumvented the
mandate. There the Court construed away the meaning of the
statute and enjoined a secondary boycott by restricting section 6
to disputes between employers and their immediate employees and
by emphasizing the words "lawfully" and "peacefully" in section
20 to infer that the statute dealt only with lawful conduct. Then
in Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW 22 the Court found a way to outlaw
primary activity, saying
[W]hen the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manu-
facture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the
supply entering. .. interstate commerce, or the price of it in inter-
state markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust
Act.2
3
Such restrictive constructions of the Clayton Act were frequent
2 4
until Congress reacted again in 1932 by passing the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.20 The committee reports preceding enactment show a
person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating
any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or
labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peace-
ful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such
person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully ob-
taining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading
any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommend-
ing, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so
to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things
of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for
lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might law-
fully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto;
nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or
held to be violations of any law of the United States.
Clayton Act § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
21254 U.S. 443 (1920).
22268 U.S. 295 (1925).
28 Id. at 310.
"4 See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n,
274 U.S. 37 (1927); Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925);
United Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265
U.S. 457 (1924); National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States,
263 U.S. 403 (1923); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922);
Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D.
Pa. 1929).
,"47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Section 13(c) of
the act provides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
[Vol. 44
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clear intent to proscribe such judicial toying with the national labor
policy.26 The Court seemed to recognize this and began to give the
act full effect. For example, the restrictive definition of a labor dis-
pute in Duplex appeared to have been effectively repudiated in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.17 A year later, in a case
involving a violent sit-down strike, the Court declared that the
elimination of wage competition is the object of labor unions but
that this is not the kind of restraint on competition that the Sherman
Act was intended to curtail.
28
Finally in 1941, thirty-three years after Lawlor and twenty-seven
years after the Clayton Act, the Court managed in United States v.
Hutcheson29 to give full effect to the labor policy by adopting a
"harmonizing text"3 concept and saying
If the facts laid in the indictment come within the conduct
enumerated in § 20 of the Clayton Act they do not constitute a
crime within the general terms of the Sherman Law because of
the explicit command of that section that such conduct shall not
be "considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States. ' ,a-
But the decision in Hutcheson was not quite as far reaching as it
might otherwise have been, for the Court also said
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not
to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or
unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unself-
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, chang-
ing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regard-
less of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
2 "That there have been abuses of judicial power in granting injunctions
in labor disputes is hardly open to discussion. The use of the injunction in
such disputes has been growing by leaps and bounds." S. REP. No. 163, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932). "The purpose of the bill is to protect the rights
of labor in the same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act, . . . which act, by reason of its construction and application
by the Federal courts, is ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent."
H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
2 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
"8Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).
29 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
20 "Therefore, whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the
Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and
§ 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing
text of outlawry of labor conduct." Id. at 231.31 Id. at 232.
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ishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means.
3 2
It was this unnecessarily broad dictum that pointed directly to the
problem of combinations between labor and management in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers."3
Although, when the Court reached Allen Bradley, it had refused
the exemption to a group of fishermen because they were considered
entrepreneurs3 4 and had struck down a state court injunction against
picketing bakeries to organize independent peddlers,35 it had not,
since the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia, directly faced the prob-
lem of unions and employers conspiring against other employers.3 "
In Allen Bradley the union combined with manufacturers of electri-
cal equipment and the contractors who installed it to close the New
York City market to all outside manufacturers. The result of this
arrangement was that prices and wages soared to the benefit of all
of the conspirators and to the detriment of everyone else. Presented
with this hard case, the Court made bad law, perhaps, by saying, in
language that was again too broad,
[W]hen the unions participated with a combination of busi-
ness men who had complete power to eliminate all competition
among themselves and to prevent all competition from others,
a situation was created not included within the exemptions of
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
3 7
The Court continued, "Our holding means that the same labor union
activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act,
dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with
business groups."88
Since the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia, then, the history of
the decisions may be viewed as an effort to give full effect to the
labor exemption prescribed by Congress. This effort reached its
peak in Hutcheson and receded in Allen Bradley in which the Court
created a sweeping exception that has bothered it ever since.39
22 Ibid.
" 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
", Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
", Bakery Drivers Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
"l Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 807-08 (1945).
7 Id. at 809.
"Id. at 810.
"Since Allen Bradley it has been held that union-employer combinations
[Vol. 44
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When the Court was faced in Pennington with another flagrant
abuse of union power, two precedents were possibly open to it-the
Allen Bradley approach offered by Mr. Justice Douglas and the
Hutcheson approach offered by Mr. Justice Goldberg.4 0 Significant-
ly, Mr. Justice White rejected both, though he failed to say so
expressly, and chose instead to attempt to balance the conflict between
the two relevant policies.4 He reasoned that there is nothing in the
national labor policy that permits a union to combine with an em-
ployer unit to enforce agreed wage standards against other employ-
ers. Quite the contrary, he decided, the labor policy requires the union
to keep itself free to bargain on a unit-by-unit basis.42 On the other
hand, the antitrust policy precludes such an agreement since the
interests of the union would be inextricably bound to those of a
favored employer.3
If in Pennington Mr. Justice White pointed out what unions
may not do, in Jewel he showed what unions may do. Here he said
that if the subject matter of an agreement is within the realm of
mandatory bargaining, the union is exempt if it unilaterally seeks
such an agreement from one employer, though the same agreement
has been made with other employers.4 4 But the rule was offered
with this caveat: the mere fact that only one employer is involved
does not mean that the antitrust exemption necessarily follows.45
Again, he pointed out that the problem is one of balancing the
relevant policies and that though a mandatory subject of bargaining
weighs heavily on the side of exemption, it is not conclusive.40
to fix prices, Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers
Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946), or to bar competition, United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954), are not within the exemp-
tion. Also, it has been held that the union's participation will not provide en-
trepreneurs with the exemption. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs.
Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949). Accord, Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v.
United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962). But it has also been held that, absent
other evidence of conspiracy, a wage contract is exempt even though it was
made to force an employer out of business. Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
" The Hutcheson approach would seem to be feasible if the language
quoted above is treated as dictum and the price control factor in Allent
Bradley is emphasized.
"1 381 U.S. at 665.
12 Id. at 666.
"Id. at 668.
"381 U.S. at 689-90.
"Id. at 689.
"Ibid.
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Thus, he decided that this marketing-hours restriction was so inti-
mately related to wages, hours and other conditions of employment
as to fall within the protection of the labor policy.
The two cases when read together, then, seem to stand for the
proposition that the union may not make extra-unit 47 bargaining
agreements even on mandatory subjects, but even when the subject
is not clearly mandatory, the mere existence of a parallel agreement
will not deprive the union of its exemption. From this one limita-
tion on Allen Bradley is readily apparent: the traditional doctrine
of antitrust law, which infers conspiracy without express agreement,
will not be applied in the area of collective bargaining.48 Moreover,
it seems clear that the broad language of Hutcheson will not be used
to exempt agreements on nonmandatory subjects.49
However, some problems are not so clearly resolved. For in-
stance, in view of the fact that predatory purpose lurked heavily in
the background of Pennington and did not appear on the surface in
Jewel, did the talk of balancing policies actually reflect at least a
partial return to the wrongful intent doctrine of the Coronado era?' °
Indeed, since the union intent in Pennington was in fact anticom-
petitive, was Mr. Justice White's emphasis on extra-unit agreements
only dictum, or will the Court actually hold all such agreements
antitrust violations in spite of their purpose?5 Further, may unions
continue to rely on industry leaders to set bargaining patterns for
the smaller companies? Is it true, as Mr. Justice Goldberg sug-
gested, that mention of competitive disadvantage will be treated as
evidence of conspiracy?52
In seeking answers to these problems and others, it must be kept
in mind that the Court was split three-three-three in both cases.53
'" Extra-unit bargaining occurs when the union agrees "with one set of
employers to impose a certain wage scale [or other terms] on other bargain-
ing units." UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).,Id. at 665 n.2. Contra, id. at 673 (concurring opinion).
,0 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
"Id. at 720 (separate opinion).
01 Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws,
32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659, 725 n.228 (1965). Professor Meltzer pointed out
that Mr. Justice White failed to take note of some evidence of extra-unit
bargaining in Jewel. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 839, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
" Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 714-16
(1965) (separate opinion).
"In both cases the opinion labeled as that of the Court involved only
three members. Justices Douglas, Black and Clark chose to rely on Allen
[Vol. 44
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It is this fact that precludes any definite answers without further
litigation or new legislation. In the meantime, the most that can be
said is that complete reliance on either Hutcheson or Allen Bradley
has been renounced by the majority of the Court.
MARTIN N. ERWIN
Labor Law-Pre-Election v. Post-Election Relief Under the LMRDA
When Raymond Harvey sought to nominate himself for office
in the National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, he dis-
covered that he was unable to do so since he was ineligible to be
a candidate. The union bylaws provided that a member could nomi-
nate only himself for office, and the union's constitution provided
that no one was eligible for nomination to a full-time union office
unless he had been a union member for five years and had served
at least 180 days in each of two of the three preceding years on
ships with union contracts. Harvey had not met the service require-
ment.1 He sued the union president, Jesse Calhoon, to enjoin the
election, alleging violations of Title I of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. This Title guarantees equal
rights to all union members to nominate candidates2 and allows any
member whose rights are violated to bring a pre-election suit in a
federal district court for a remedy.3
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court in
Calhoon v. Harvey4 was whether plaintiff Harvey's rights under
Bradley, concurring in Pennington and dissenting in Jewel. In a separate
opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, con-
curred in both cases but dissented from the extra-unit bargaining rule.
This separate opinion raised many of the important problems inherent in
the opinion of the Court. Its basic position is that Mr. Justice White has
ignored the fundamental realities of collective bargaining and established
barriers to negotiation which will frustrate the congressional intent to pro-
mote labor peace and stability.
'Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486, 487 (2d Cir. 1963).
2 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 101(a) (1), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §
411(a) (1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA] provides:
Equal Rights.-Every member of a labor organization shall have
equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organiza-
tions, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the de-
liberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution
and bylaws.
LMRDA § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1965).
'379 U.S. 134 (1964).
